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In the past three decades, Chinese electricity industry has experienced a series of regulatory reforms 
serving different purposes at different stages. In 2002, the former vertically integrated electricity 
utility - the State Power Corporation (SPC) – was divested and the generation sector was separated 
from the transmission and distribution networks in an effort to improve production efficiency. In this 
paper we study the impact of the reform on efficiency of fossil-fired power plants using plant-level 
data during 2000-2008. Our results from the data envelopment analysis (DEA) and panel regressions 
show that: 1) the total factor productivity (TFP) growth mainly comes from technological change; 2) 
the  technical  efficiency  of  previously  SPC-managed  power  plants  is  converging  to  that  of 
better-performing  independent  power  producers  (IPPs);  3)  capacity  utilization  and  unit  size  are 
significant factors affecting changes in technical efficiency and the pattern of converging technical 
efficiency between the two kinds of power plants; 4) most plants operate at increasing returns to 
scale indicating further cost savings could be achieved through increasing output. 
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Over the past three decades, China’s electricity industry has experienced three major reforms in 1985, 
1997 and 2002 respectively. Before 1985, the electricity sector was managed by the Ministry of 
Electricity Power (MEP) and the regional Bureau of Electricity Power (BEP). The reform in 1985 
changed the investment institution. Local governments, domestic enterprises and foreign investors 
have been allowed to form independent power producers (IPPs) since then. The focus of this reform 
was mainly to remove the capital bottleneck that had constrained the country’s electricity sector for 
decades, and to expand capacity to meet the increasing demand driven mostly by the accelerated 
economic growth. The second reform in 1997 changed the management system of the electricity 
industry. The main purpose of this reform was to improve management efficiency and separate the 
administrative function from the business function of the power plants previously managed by MEP. 
As a result, a new public utility – SPC – was established as an independent market entity. SPC then 
took over all generation, transmission and distribution assets previously managed by MEP. MEP was 
dismantled  and  its  administrative  and  decision-making  functions  were  transferred  to  the  State 
Economic and Trade Committee (SETC). The most recent reform was introduced in 2002. The newly 
established SPC was divested and dismantled into 11 new corporations including five generation 
groups,  two  grid  operators  and  four  auxiliary  corporations.  Each  of  the  five  generation  groups 
manages a large number of power plants. The reform was to break the vertical monopoly of the SPC 
and  introduce  competition  on  the  generation  side  (Ma  and  He,  2008).  Experiences  from  other  
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deregulated  electricity  markets  have  suggested  that  restraining  the  exercise  of  market  power  by 
dominant  utility  companies  is  one  of  the  crucial  factors  for  a  market  reform  to  be  successful 
(Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein et al., 2002). It is also hoped that the right to dispatch power will be 
based on economic efficiency and merit order rather than political factors such as protection of 
state-owned  assets  and  employment.  The  regulatory  authority  expects  that  the  divestiture  and 
decentralization  reform  would  eventually  increase  the  competitiveness  and  improve  the  overall 
productivity performance of China’s electricity industry. 
 
There have been many studies of these reforms and policies from the perspective of macro policies; 
however, very few studies have been devoted to quantifying the impacts of the reforms and policies 
based on detailed micro analyses. The purpose of this paper is to use the data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) Malmquist approach to estimate relative efficiency gains in the electricity sector and identify 
significant factors affecting efficiency changes before and after the most recent reform in 2002. The 
study benefits from a rich collection of plant-level data. The remainder of this paper proceeds as 
follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies on production efficiency of China’s electricity industry. 
Section 3 introduces the DEA and Malmquist methodology and data. Section 4 presents the DEA 
results and performs a second-stage analysis and discussion. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Studies on Efficiency of the Electricity Industry 
 
Over the past half century, different methods have been used to measure technological change and 
scale economies in power generation. Most early studies measured the technological change of the 
power industry by studying the shifts in the production and cost functions. Christensen and Greene 
(1976) used the translog cost function to study the economies of scale for U.S. firms producing 
electric power and they found that there were significant scale economies in 1955 but such scale 
economies largely disappeared by 1970. Cowing and Smith (1978) provided an excellent survey of 
studies of steam electric generation based on production and cost functions. Later studies on electric 
productivity tended to focus on the effect of ownership and market structure on efficiency (De Alessi, 
1974; Meyer, 1975; Pescatrice and Trapani, 1980; Dilorenzo and Robinson, 1982; Atkinson and 
Halvorsen, 1986; Kwoka, 1996). More recently, Berry and Mixon (1999) used the translog cost 
function to estimate cost differences in serving different types of buyers. Maloney (2001) also used 
the  translog  function  to  measure  economies  of  capacity  utilization  in  electricity  generation. 
Borenstein et al (2002) used a production function to derive the departures from competitive pricing 
in California’s restructured wholesale electricity market and found significant inefficiency due to 
market power. Fabrizio et al. (2007) found public owned plants whose owners are largely insulated 
from market competition, experienced the smallest efficiency gains, while investor-owned plants in 
states that restructured their wholesale electricity markets improved the most. 
 
Apart from using cost and production functions, Frontier methods such as data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) have also been widely used to measure productivity. 
The use of these non-parametric and parametric approaches not only allows us to compare individual 
firms to best practice firms, but also to identify sources of inefficiency. Such insights allow policy 
makers to formulate better policies to improve the efficiency of electricity industry. Färe et al. (1985) 
were the first to use the DEA approach to compare the efficiency of public and private electric  
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utilities and they found public utilities are more efficient and the inefficiency of private utilities was 
due to the lack of allocative efficiency. Cote (1989) applied the stochastic frontier cost function to 
estimate  technical  efficiency  of  62  electric  utilities  under  different  ownership  structures  built 
between 1965 and 1973. His results suggested that cooperatives were the most efficient type of 
ownership structure compared with small private and public electric utilities. Färe et al. (1990) used 
the Malmquist productivity index to study changes in technical efficiency as well as changes in 
frontier technology of 19 coal-fired generating plants in Illinois during 1975-1981. They found that 
the  average  rates  of  productivity  growth  were  relatively  stable  and  both  efficiency  changes  and 
technology changes play important roles in productivity growth. Pollitt (1995) also used the DEA 
approach to look at the ownership-productive efficiency question for both the power plants and the 
transmission and distribution systems in OECD countries and no significant differences in efficiency 
were found between different types of ownership or economic organization. Coelli (1997) applied 
both the DEA and SFA approaches to estimate the productivity change of 13 base-load, coal-fired 
plants in Australia from 1981/82 to 1990/91. The results suggested a TFP growth of up to 16 percent 
over the study period. Olatubi and Dismukes (2000) applied the DEA approach to examine efficiency 
of  coal-fired  generation  facilities  in  the  United  States  in  1996  and  found  significant  allocative 
inefficiency. Kleit and Terrell (2001) also studied the efficiency of power generation in the US in 
1996 but they applied a Bayesian stochastic frontier model and their results indicate that most plants 
operate at increasing returns to scale, suggesting further cost savings could be achieved through 
increasing production. Hiebert (2002) estimated a stochastic frontier cost function together with a 
model of plant inefficiencies. The paper found significant  association between U.S. power plant 
efficiencies and capacity utilization, the number of plants under utility management, ownership form 
and state-level restructuring activity over the period 1988-1997. Arocena and Price (2002) applied a 
Malmquist  approach  to  examine  the  impacts  of  different  regulatory  schemes  on  performance  of 
publicly owned and privately owned generators in Spain. They found that publicly owned generators 
are more efficient under cost-of-service regulation while privately owned generators (but not public 
ones) responded to incentive regulation by increasing efficiency. Abbott (2006) applied a Malmquist 
approach to estimate the efficiency change of Australian electricity sector over the period 1969-1999 
and  the  paper  found  significant  efficiency  improvement  before  as  well  as  after  the  substantial 
restructuring of the industry in the early 1990s. Kwoka and Pollitt (2010) also applied the DEA 
approach to study the impact of mergers on power plants’ efficiencies over the period of 1994 to 
2003 and the results suggested that the merger did not consistently improve the cost efficiency. And 
more recently, Sueyoshi and Goto (2011)’s DEA study found that the unified efficiency of Japanese 
electricity generation (incorporating undesirable output such as CO2) has not improved for the period 
2004-2008. 
 
Although the scale of China’s electricity generation is comparable to that of the US, detailed analyses 
of the efficiency of this sector have been very limited compared with the case of the US. Given the 
large scale of China’s electricity sector, its coal-dependent nature, and its significance to the global 
community with regards to the control of climate change, a sound understanding of impacts of recent 
reforms and productivity performance of the sector becomes increasingly important. However, only a 
handful of studies have examined the impact of recent reforms in China’s electricity sector on the 
efficiency of power generation using either macro or micro level data. Lam and Shiu (2004) applied 
a DEA approach to province level data to assess the productivity growth of thermal power industries  
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over the period of 1995 to 2000 with a focus on the regulatory reform in 1997. The results showed 
that technological change accounts for almost all the TFP growth and provinces not dominated by 
SPC have achieved higher levels of technical efficiency. Yang and Pollitt (2009) also examined the 
productivity performance of Chinese coal-fired power plants based on a cross-section sample of 221 
plants in 2002; however the focus of the paper was primarily on the relative performance of different 
DEA-based models when both desirable inputs and outputs and undesirable outputs are incorporated. 
Du  et  al.(2009)  investigated  the  impact  of  the  regulatory  reform  in  2002  on  China’s  electricity 
generation  efficiency  using  a Differences-in-Differences  (DID) approach and plant-level  national 
survey data collected in 1997 and 2004 and they found significant input efficiency improvement in 
labor and non-fuel materials but not in fuel input. Our study builds on the existing literature and 
particularly extends Lam and Shiu (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Results from Lam and Shiu (2004) 
suggested  potential  efficiency  benefits  from  replacing  regulated  monopoly  with  a  market-based 
industry structure. The time is ripe now for an investigation whether such benefits have materialized 
or not. While Du et al. (2009) was the first to confirm the efficiency improvement due to the 2002 
reform, our study differs in several ways. First, our plant-level panel database has data on several 
years of pre-reform and post-reform periods which is unlike all previous studies. Second, we employ 
a powerful nonparametric technique – Malmquist index – to examine the sources of TFP changes: 
changes in pure technical efficiency, scale efficiency or technology frontier. Finally, Lam and Shiu 
(2004) correctly pointed out that the technical profile of generation units such as age and size could 
be potentially significant factors affecting efficiency. With a rich collection of plant-level data, we 
are able to investigate the impacts of these factors. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Malmquist Index 
 
Building  on  the  ideas  of  Farrell  (1957),  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA)  method  was  firstly 
developed in the seminal work of Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978 (Charnes et al., 1978). DEA 
is used to empirically measure the productive efficiency of decision making units (DMUs). Linear 
programming is used to identify a frontier on which the relative performance of all DMUs in the 
sample  can  be  compared  with.  In  other  words,  DEA  only  benchmarks  DMUs  against  the  best 
performer. If one DMU can produce certain levels of outputs using specific levels of inputs, other 
DMUs  of  equal  scale  should  be  capable  of  doing  the  same.  Using  higher  levels  of  inputs  or 
producing  lower  level  of  outputs  are  both  inefficient.  DEA  has  the  advantage  of  not  assuming 
particular functional forms which in many cases involves subjective judgment; however it does not 
provide  a  functional  relationship  relating  output  and  input.  For  studies  focusing  on  efficiency 
measures rather than the functional relationship, DEA is an adequate and powerful approach. There 
are a number of different DEA approaches with the most basic being the CCR model (Charnes et al., 
1978). Later models are able to address variable returns to scale. Seiford and Thrall (1990) provided 
an excellent account of the methodological developments of DEA in the 1970s and 1980s. Recent 
DEA models have been developed to incorporate undesirable outputs to address the environmental 
impacts of economic production (e.g. Bernstein et al. 1990, and, Yaisawarng and Klein, 1994 for 
power industry;  Färe  et  al.,  1989,  and, Hailu and Veeman, 2000  and 2001a  for pulp  and paper 
industry). Hailu and Veeman (2001b) discussed alternative methods for environmentally adjusted  
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productivity analysis including both parametric methods and nonparametric methods such as DEA. 
Zhou et al. (2008) conducted a survey of DEA applications in energy and environmental studies. 
DEA  models  have  also  been  developed  recently  to  accommodate  stochastic  elements  in  a 
state-contingent setting with random inputs (Chambers et al., 2011).   
 
To introduce the DEA models to be used in this study, we begin with standard notation. We assume 
that there are k = 1, 2, …, K DMUs (or power plants) in the sample. Let         
   be a (     ) 
vector  of  M  different  inputs  used  by  DMU  k.  Let         
   be  a  (     )  vector  of  N  different 
outputs  produced  by  DMU  k.  Let   ,     be  the  corresponding  (     ),  (     )  matrices  of 
observed inputs and outputs, respectively, for all K DMUs. And let        
   be a (     ) vector of 
intensities  that  are  used  to  weight  the  different  DMUs  in  constructing  the  reference  frontier  to 
evaluate DMU k. Then for each DMU k, k = 1, 2, …, K, an output-oriented technical efficiency 
measure with constant returns to scale (CRS) can be computed by firstly solving the following linear 
programming (LP) problem: 
 
     
s.j.               , 
             , 
       ,                                                              (1) 
 
where     is a scalar and       defines the technical efficiency of DMU k which varies between zero 
and one with a value of one indicating a point on the frontier and a technically efficient DMU. The 
CRS  LP  problem  can be modified to account  for variable  returns to scale  (VRS) by adding the 
convexity constraint:          , where      is a (     ) vector of ones. To determine the nature of 
the scale efficiency – increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale, one can run an additional LP 
problem  by  replacing  the  restriction          with  a  non-increasing  returns  to  scale  (NIRS) 
restriction:          . In this paper, the CRS setting and VRS setting will be applied to compute the 
technical efficiency scores which can then be decomposed into pure efficiency and scale efficiency 
scores, and the NIRS setting is used to determine the nature of the scale economy. 
 
As  standard  DEA  models  only  benchmark  DMUs  against  the  best  performers  given  existing 
technology, they do not account for the changes in the technology – i.e. shift in the frontier. In this 
study, we also use the Malmquist index estimated by DEA-like LP technique to calculate the total 
factor productivity (TFP) and decompose the TFP into technological change, pure efficiency change 
and scale efficiency change. The Malmquist index was first suggested by Caves et al. (1982) and 
further developed by Färe et al. (1989 and 1992) and Färe et al. (1994). The index uses Shephard 
(1953)’s distance functions that describe multi-input and multi-output production technology. We 
provide a detailed construction of an output-based Malmquist productivity change index in Appendix 
A and present the decomposed Malmquist productivity change index in the following: 
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where        
         ,        
               ,        
         ,  and        
                 are  the  output 
distance  functions
1  by which production points with input and output vectors are compared to 
frontier technologies from the same year assuming CRS or VRS technology.        
               and 
      
             are output distance functions by which production points are compared to frontier 
technologies at different points of time assuming CRS technology. The CRS or VRS output-oriented 
LP used to calculate these distance functions are identical to LP problem defined in Equation (1) with 
or  without  the  convexity  (VRS)  restriction.  The  first  term  and  second  term  outside  the  bracket 
measure the change in scale efficiency and the change in pure efficiency between period t and t+1. 
These two term together measure the change in technical efficiency and describe the “catching-up” 
to the frontier. The bracketed term measures technological change, i.e. the shift of technological 
frontier. For all three terms, a value greater than one or less than one denotes an improvement or 
regression respectively. 
 
3.2 Data, Inputs and Output 
 
Our data covers a sample of 40 power plants from 2000 to 2008. We have chosen to limit our sample 
to large thermal power plants as consistent data on smaller plants are more difficult to obtain. We 
managed  to  collect  a  consistent  dataset  of  40  plants.  This  final  sample  consists  of  26  plants 
previously owned by SPC and currently owned by the five generation groups (hereafter referred to as 
“GROUP” plants), and 14 plants owned by independent power producers (hereafter referred as “IPP” 
plants). Data on inputs, output and capacity factors are collected from Statistical Compilation of 
China’s  Electricity  Industry  (CEC,  2000-2008),  which  is  kindly  provided  by  China’s  Electricity 
Council.  Information  on  age  and  unit  size  is  collected  from  A  List  of  Running  Desulfurization 
Facilities on Coal-fired Units (MEP, 2011) and websites of power plants. More information on data 
collection is provided in Appendix B.   
 
In our study, each power plant is considered as a DMU. Electricity generated by each DMU is used 
as the output variable and installed generation capacity, labor and fuel are the three inputs used for 
electricity generation
2. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for these  input and output variables 
and some additional variables. 
 
Table 1 - Summary Statistics of Key Variables (Year = 2008) 
Variables 




Min  Max  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min  Max 
GENERATION (10
8 KWHs
a)  76.54  26.12  45.3  138.28  75.85  20.33  41.26  110.04 
CAPACITY (MWs
b)  1444.25  483.79  800  2650  1372.86  407.25  600*  2070 
                                                        
1  An  output  distance  function  measures a  maximal  proportional expansion or  contraction  of  the  output  vector  compared  with  a 
benchmark output vector (the frontier), given an input vector. 
2  In this paper, we do not consider undesirable outputs such as sulfur emission. To the best of our knowledge, there is virtually no data 
on emissions of power plants in China. While sulfur emission can be estimated using the IPCC reference approach, but this also needs 
substantial  data  on  the  quality  of  fuels  –  especially  the  parameter  on  sulfur  content.  In  addition,  given  China’s  large-scale 
desulfurization effort in the electricity sector during the past few years, a good estimate of actual sulfur emission should also consider 
efficiency of different types of desulfurization facilities.  
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LABOR (Number of Employees)  573  467  265  2186  689  449  327  1909 
FUEL (10,000 Tons of SCE
c)  258.16  83.65  162.92  461.43  255.87  63.39  142.09  365.65 
UTILIZATION
d  0.64  0.07  0.47  0.76  0.69  0.08  0.56  0.84 
AGE
d (Years)  15.2  6.12  6.5  31  13.52  4.17  7.5  23.17 
UNIT SIZE
d (MWs)  382  141.7  200  615  366.4  194.7  180  800 
a KWHs – kilowatt hours; 
b MWs – megawatts; 
c SCE – standard coal equivalent; 
d We use a relative measure of these 
variables in our regression models; however statistics here are on actual values. 
 
GENERATION 
The Compilation only reports total gross generation which includes the electricity consumed by the 
power plant itself. However, it is the net generation that best describes the effective output produced 
from a combination of all inputs. We thus subtract the self electricity usage from the gross generation 
and use the net generation as the output variable. 
 
CAPACITY 
Total installed nameplate capacity is used as a measure of the DMU’s capital input and it may change 




Labour input is measure by the total number of employees. Appendix B provides more details on our 
figures of labour input. 
 
FUEL 
In  almost  all  Chinese  power  plants,  oil-fired  or  gas-fired  equipment  is  also  installed  for 
boiler-preheating  and  standby  purposes.  The  boiler  type,  design  of  combustion  facilities,  and 
capacity of these equipments vary across plants. Given a certain load of a boiler, the more oil it 
consumes, the less coal it burns (Yang and Pollitt, 2009). In addition, the quality of coal affects the 
operating performance of a coal-fired generating unit. As the calorific value of coal falls, the amount 
of coal consumed increases and the probability of outages and unit derating also increases (Joskow 
and Schmalensee, 1987). To provide an overall measure of the fuel input, all fuel uses including coal, 
oil, gas and electricity (self usage) are converted and measured in the same unit – 10,000 tons of 
standard  coal  equivalent  (SCE),  which  has  adjusted  for  the  type  and  quality  of  fuels  used  for 
electricity generation.   
 
4. Results and Discussions 
 
The results of the Malmquist index decomposition are summarized in Fig.1. The figure presents 
accumulated annual changes in TFP, technological change (shift of frontier), pure efficiency and 
scale efficiency with the year of 2000 being the benchmark. The two series in each panel (a, b, c, d) 
are means for GROUP and IPP plants. We make three observations on Fig.1: 1) the up-trending 
curves  show  that  plants  in  our  sample  have  on  average  experienced  positive  TFP  (a)  and 
technological change (b) and the growth has been strongest before 2004; 2) higher GROUP curves 
indicate that GROUP plants have outperformed IPP plants for most efficiency change indicators  
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during  this  period;  3)  the  similarity  between  panel  a  and  b  shows  that  technological  change 
contributes a significant proportion to the overall TFP change. As the changes in pure efficiency (c) 
and scale efficiency (d) together, i.e. the technical efficiency, capture how DMUs have been catching 
up to the frontier, we provide the combined accumulated technical efficiency (panel a) in Fig.2. Fig.2 
also presents actual technical efficiency scores. We make two observations on Fig.2: 1) Lam and 
Shiu (2004) found that provinces and autonomous regions not dominated by SPC have achieved 
higher levels of technical efficiency during the period of 1995-2000. Our results are consistent to 
their study and provide micro level evidence that GROUP plants which are previously owned and 
managed by SPC are on average technically less efficient than plants not previously managed by 
SPC, i.e. IPP plants; 2) Fig.2 also shows that there is a clear pattern that the less efficient GROUP 
plants are catching up to the more efficient IPP plants. By the end of this period, the efficiency 
difference between the two has  become very limited. Complete results  of Malmquist  index and 
technical efficiency for all power plants are listed in Appendix C. 
 
However, it is unclear at this stage whether such “catching up” was due to the reform in 2002 or 
other factors that might have influence the two kinds of power plants (GROUP and IPP) in different 
ways.  In  order  to  identify  the  impacts  of  the  reform  in  2002  and  identify  factors  affecting  the 
efficiency change, we perform a second stage regression analysis.  Our dependent variable is the 
estimated technical efficiency scores for the 40 power plants over the period 2000-2008. Given that 
the technical efficiency score has a value censored at one, the OLS regression does not provide 
unbiased and consistent estimates. Instead, we employ a panel Tobit regression analysis and control 
for several time-invariant and time-variant variables. 
 
 









































































































2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
d
Fig.1 Accumulated Changes
Group Mean IPP Mean 
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Sources: Malmquist index and DEA calculations (The dotted line denotes the benchmark at the value of one). 
 
UTILIZATION 
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) found that departures from a frontier may reflect the systematic 
effect of conditions that contribute to inefficiency. Factors such as demand induced growth rate in 
electricity supply or the demand constrained capacity utilization may constrain the ability of the 
utility to attain the frontier
3. Because electricity cannot be conveniently stored, generation facilities 
follow the load across demand cycles. Although total gross capacity can be adjusted in the long run – 
either by retiring outdated units or installing new units, varying demand is largely met by adjusting 
capacity utilization of existing units. Maloney (2001) used a two dimensional definition of capacity 
utilization – generation relative to capacity when a unit is connected to the system and the percent of 
time the unit is disconnected, and found that both dimensions affected plant efficiencies. Hiebert 
(2002) found similar results while defining capacity utilization as actual generation output divided by 
capacity  output  (nameplate  capacity  times  8760).  In  this  paper,  we  follow  Reifschneider  and 
Stevenson (1991) and Hiebert (2002)’s definition of capacity utilization. However, given that our 
dependent variable is a relative efficiency measure, we use a relative utilization variable – actual 
utilization minus the maximum utilization in that year – in our model. 
 
AGE 
It is generally expected that performance eventually to deteriorate as a unit ages; however, units may 
go through a break-in period early in their lives, which is usually characterized by a high level of 
forced outrages and derating or cycling of the facility. This means that observed performance may 
                                                        
3  There are several reasons why a plant may have a capacity utilization factor lower than 100%: 1) a unit may be out of service or 
operating at reduced output for part of the time due to equipment failures or regular maintenance; 2) output is curtailed because the 
electricity is not needed (e.g. lower demand); 3) generators choose to reduce output or even shut down because the price of electricity 



































































2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
b
Fig.2 Technical Efficiency
Group Mean IPP Mean 
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actually improve during these earlier years of operation (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1987; Pollitt, 
1995). In this study we define the age of a generating unit as calendar year minus year of initial 
operation. However, since our subject of study is each plant instead of individual unit, the age of 
each plant is derived as the average age of each plant’s all units weighted by each unit’s nameplate 
capacity. Similarly, our AGE variable in the models also follows a relative definition – each plant’s 




Other things being equal (e.g. steam temperature, pressure and fuel characteristics), larger boiler 
should reduce the unit’s heat rate; however the advantage of larger size should be more significant at 
small scale than large scale. This is because lager units have poorer availability than smaller units 
and the advantage of larger units for heat rate may disappear when the costs of poor availability are 
factored in (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1987). Each plant may have multiple units of different sizes. 
We thus calculate a plant’s unit size as the average size of each plant’s all units weighted by each 
unit’s nameplate capacity. Here again, we define our UNIT SIZE variable in the models as a relative 
measure compared to the plant with largest weighted average unit size, and allow this variable to 
enter with a quadratic specification. 
 
REFORM 
The  divestiture  reform  was  introduced  in  2002  and  took  effect  in  2003.  We  create  a  REFORM 
dummy with a value of zero for the period 2000 – 2002 and a value of one for the period 2003-2008 
to test whether the reform has in general improved the performance controlling for other factors. 
 
GROUP 
Following many other studies on the ownership-efficiency issue (e.g. Boardman and Vining, 1989; 
Hiebert, 2002; Fabrizio et al., 2007), we also use a dummy to indicate the ownership of the plant. 
The dummy takes a value of one for GROUP plants and zero for IPP plants. As the divestiture 
directly affected plants previously owned by SPC (i.e. GROUP plants) and only indirectly affected 
the IPP plants through increased competition, we expect the impact on efficiency performance would 
be different for the two categories of plants. We interact the GROUP dummy with the REFORM 
dummy to capture possibly different impacts. 
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Source: Statistical Compilation of China’s Electricity Industry (CEC, 2000-2008); A List of Running Desulfurization 
Facilities on Coal-fired Units (MEP, 2011); websites of power plants; authors’ calculation 
 
Summary statistics on actual values of UTILIZATION, AGE and UNIT SIZE are provided for the year 
of 2008 in Table 1. Fig.3 shows the average utilitization, age and unit size for GROUP plants and 
IPP plants for the period under study. As expected, the utilization (panel a) was highest in 2004 
when the shortage of electricity supply was most severe in China. The tension between electricity 
supply and demand has been relived since 2004. The utilization was higher for IPP plants; however 
the difference became smaller in 2008 compared with 2000. While the average age for both kinds of 
plants were decreasing, units of GROUP plants are on average older than those of IPP plants (panel 
b). There was a sharp difference in the change of unit size between the two kinds. While both seemed 
to have larger units over time, the growth in unit size was much faster for GROUP plants (panel c). 
To a large extent, the decreasing age and increasing size were results of China’s recent effort to 
replace outdated small thermal units with new large units. In 1999, China started a national policy 
effort to shut down small-scale thermal units, where small-scale was defined as a unit with a capacity 
less than 50 MWs
4. Due to power shortage in early 2000s, the policy was not fully implemented until 
the 11
th  Five  Year  Plan  (2006-2010).  In  2006,  the  Chinese  government  implemented  the  Large 
Substitute for Small program (LSS) with a target of 50 GW of small-scale power plant capacity for 
closure by the end of this period (2010)
5. In fact, 76.8GW had been closed by 2010. Fig. 4 illustrates 
the total number and average size of closed units during the period 1999-2010. 
                                                        
4  These small units are generally inefficient and also highly polluting. The average total cost per kilowatt hour for small plants is 
almost three times the cost for large plants. Most of these units were state-owned units built to serve localities that had in the past 
experienced severe electricity shortages. 
5  According to the new program, the following categories of thermal units are targeted for closure: 1) units below 50 MW; 2) un its 
below 100 MW that have been operating for over 20 years; 3) units below 200 MW that have reached the end of their design lives; 4) 
units with coal consumption 10% higher than the provincial average or 15% higher than the national average; 5) all other units that fail 
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Source: A List of Closed Small Thermal Units (NDRC, various issues); authors’ calculation. 
Note: The large number and small average size in 2008 are due to the closure of a large number of very small oil-fired 
units; Data for 2009 only includes those closed in Sept. to Dec. as data on units closed during Jan. to Aug. was not 
released by NDRC. 
 
Table 2 shows the results from three regressions. Model A simply confirms the two observations we 
make on panel b in Fig. 2: 1) GROUP plants which are previously owned and managed by SPC are 
on average technically less efficient than plants not previously managed by SPC, i.e. IPP plants; 2) 
less efficient GROUP plants are catching up to the more efficient IPP plants after the reform. In 
Model 2, we control for relative UTILIZATION, AGE and UNIT SIZE. Our results are generally 
consistent with the findings of previous studies (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1987; Reifschneider and 
Stevenson, 1991; Maloney, 2001; Hiebert, 2002). First, a plant’s technical efficiency is significantly 
associated  with  capacity  utilization  factor.  Other  things  being  equal,  higher  capacity  utilization 
factors are associated with higher technical efficiencies. Second, the impact of a unit’s capacity size 
is significant and nonlinear – technical efficiency first improves with increased unit size; however 
further increase of unit size may actually decrease efficiency. More importantly, even after such 
factors are controlled for, we still find the different impacts of the divestiture reform in 2002 on the 
two kinds  of power plants  to  be significant.  A positive interaction term  - GROUP*REFORM – 
indicates that previously less efficient GROUP plants have converged to more efficient IPP plants. 
Removing the insignificant AGE variables in Model C does not change our findings.   
 
As a final observation, we also examine the scale efficiency of the power plants in our sample. Fig.5 
shows the number of plants with increasing returns to scale (IRS), constant returns to scale (CRS) 




























Total Number of Closed Units (Left)
Average Size of Closed Units (MWs, Right)
Fig.4 Small Thermal Units Closedown 1999-2010 
  14 
most plants operate at increasing returns to scale which indicates overall performance can be further 
improved by increasing output. A comparison between Chinese and U.S. coal-fired power plants 
shows a substantial gap in capacity utilization factors. During the same period of 2000-2008, U.S. 
coal-fired power plants have on average achieved a capacity utilization factor of 71.75% while the 
figure for Chinese ones is only 66.92% (EIA, 2010). Increasing the utilization of existing capacity 
could improve the sale efficiency. 
 
Table 2 – Random Effects Tobit Regression Results (2000-2008) 
Dependent Variable :    Technical Efficiency Score 
Independent 
Variables 
Model A  Model B  Model C 
Coefficient  P > |Z|  Coefficient  P > |Z|  Coefficient  P > |Z| 
   
     
     
GROUP  -0.0392***  0.019  -0.0370***  0.003  -0.0400***  0.001 
REFORM  -0.0015  0.758  -0.0130***  0.005  -0.0132***  0.004 
GROUP*REFORM  0.0173***  0.004  0.0141***  0.010  0.0143***  0.009 
UTILIZATION 
   
0.1605***  0.000  0.1609***  0.000 
AGE 
   
-0.0038  0.212     
AGE Squared 
   
-0.0001  0.176     
UNIT SIZE 
   
-0.0028*  0.058  -0.0034**  0.014 
UNIT SIZE Squared 
   
-0.0001**  0.003  -0.0001***  0.000 
CONSTANT  0.9528***  0.000  0.9773***  0.000  0.9919***  0.000 
   
     
     
Sigma_u  0.048***  0.000  0.0314***  0.000  0.0313***  0.000 
Wald Chi2  24.24***  145.54***  142.28*** 
Log likelihood  645.402  691.7482  690.8215 
Observations  360 
*,**,*** refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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In this paper, we investigate the impact of China’s divestiture reform in the electricity industry in 
2002 on thermal power plants’ efficiency performance. We have observed a positive TFP growth 
during the period 2000-2008 which is largely due to a significant technological change – i.e. a shift 
of technology frontier. Our plant-level DEA analysis also reveals a pronounced converging pattern. 
Our results firstly provide plant-level evidence for Lam and Shiu’s study (2004) that SPC managed 
power plants were generally less efficient than IPP plants in early 2000s. However, the divestiture 
reform in 2002 has significantly improved the efficiency of these under-performers who have since 
converged to the technology frontier mostly represented by the IPP plants. This conclusion still holds 
even after we control for such technical factors as capacity utilization, age and size of units. We also 
find  that  the  majority  of  plants  in  our  sample  operate  at  increasing  returns  to  scale,  suggesting 
potential benefits from increasing outputs. 
 
The main purpose of the reform in 2002 was to improve efficiency of power plants by introducing 
competition mechanism, especially on the generation side. The divestiture reform was crafted to 
break the natural monopoly and limit the concentration of generation assets. It is also hoped that the 
right to dispatch power will be eventually based on economic efficiency and merit order rather than 
political factors such as protection of state-owned assets and employment. Our research has shown 
that the objective has been partially fulfilled as indicated by efficiency improvement of power plants 
previously managed by SPC. However, this transition is far from completion. In order to realize the 
full  benefit  of  the  reform,  some  constraints  need  to  be  addressed.  A  fully  functioning  national 










2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
IRS CRS DRS
Fig.5 Number of Power Plants with Different RTS 
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barriers across regions as well as inconsistent price mechanisms in the coal and electricity. Since 
2004, the Northeast region of China has been selected to perform a trial operation of competitive 
bidding  and  dispatch.  Zhang  and  Parsons  (2008)  show  that  although  the  generation  asset 
concentration level is relative low for the whole region but is often much more concentrated at the 
province level. Given that transmission constraints between provinces are often binding,  the full 
benefit  of  a  regional  wholesale  market  is  hard  to  achieve.  In  addition,  China’s  current  price 
mechanism in the electricity industry is characterized by completely competitive coal prices in the 
upstream, partially competitive on-grid electricity prices in the middle (incomplete linking of coal 
prices and on-grid electricity prices), and regulated retail prices in the downstream. This unbalanced 
price mechanism further constrains the effectiveness of the market reform. 
 
 
Appendix A – Mulmquist Productivity Change Index 
 
Firstly suggested by Caves et al. (1982) and further developed by Färe et al. (1989 and 1992) and 
Färe et al. (1994). The index uses Shephard (1953)’s distance functions that describe multi-input and 
multi-output production technology. Caves et al (1982) proposed an out-put based Malmquist index 
relative to a single CRS technology from year t or t+1 as: 
 
        
      
             
      
         
                 
      
               
      
           
                                      
 
Färe et al. (1989) suggested using a geometric mean of the above two indexes to avoid an arbitrary 
choice of referencing frontier: 
 
                       
      
             
      
         
 
      
               
      




                              
 
With  standard  equation  manipulations,  the  above  productivity  change  index  can  be  further 
decomposed into technological change, pure efficiency change and scale efficiency change (Färe et 
al., 1989, 1992; Färe et al., 1994): 
 
                   
   
      
         
      
         
      
               
      
               
     
      
               
      
         
   
      
             
      
               
 
      
         
      




                                                      
 
As the first bracket term is the chained scale efficiency change, the above index can be simplified to 
yield the index we used in Equation (2) of the text:  
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Appendix B – Data Collection 
 
Chinese electricity authorities have only started to release plant-level information until very recently. 
Our data has been collected from a range of government publications and documents, supplemented 
by information disclosed on websites of power plants. 
 
GENERATION / CAPACITY / FUEL / UTILIZATION / GROUP 
The  major  data  source  for  these  variables  is  the  Statistical  Compilation  of  China’s  Electricity 
Industry  (CEC,  2000-2008)  provided  by  China’s  Electricity  Council.  The  Compilation  was 
previously  considered  as  confidential  internal  document  and  not  released  to  the  public.  The 
document  provides  plant-level  data  on  annual  generation,  installed  capacity,  physical  volume  of 
different kinds of fuels, standard fuel consumption for power generation and supply, and annual 
generation hours. The Compilation also identifies the ownership structure of each plant. We managed 
to compile a balanced panel for 40 plants. 
 
AGE / UNIT SIZE 
The  Compilation  also  provides  information  on  the  number  of  generation  units  and  nameplate 
capacity of each unit for all plants; however, it does not report the initial operation time of each unit. 
Such  information  is  included  in  a  recent  document  released  by  the  Ministry  of  Environmental 
Protection - A List of Running Desulfurization Facilities on Coal-fired Units (MEP, 2011). This is 




None of the above documents provide information on the number of employees for each power plant. 
In this study, we estimate the number of employees based on standard labor quota in the electricity 
industry. Specifically, we follow the Labor Force Quota for Thermal Power Plants (SPC, 1998) to 
estimate  employee  numbers  for  the  period  2000-2002,  and  the  Labor  Force  Quota  for  General 
Thermal Power Plants (CHC, 1998) and the Labor Force Quota for New Thermal Power Plants 
(CHC, 2008) to estimate employee numbers for the period 2003-2008. These documents provide 
estimated employee numbers for typical power plants with different technologies (coal, oil or gas), 
number of units, unit capacity etc. 
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Appendix C – Malmquist Productivity Change Index and DEA Technical Efficiency 
Malmquist Index for Annual Changes (Geometric Mean for 2000-2008) 














DMU 1  1.0878    1.0272    1.0585    1.0086    1.0499   
DMU 2  1.0154    1.0128    1.0030    1.0676    0.9397   
DMU 3  1.0013    1.0194    0.9816    0.9978    0.9843   
DMU 4  1.0821    1.0107    1.0702    1.0758    0.9937   
DMU 5  1.0175    1.0478    0.9699    0.9661    1.0044   
DMU 6  1.0850    1.0605    1.0233    0.9469    1.0809   
DMU 7  1.0450    1.0243    1.0191    1.0261    0.9936   
DMU 8  1.0232    1.0209    1.0024    1.0226    0.9811   
DMU 9  1.0883    1.0777    1.0104    1.0314    0.9795   
DMU 10  1.0496    1.0322    1.0177    0.9568    1.0640   
DMU 11  1.0163    1.0187    0.9986    1.0008    0.9976   
DMU 12  1.1162    1.0796    1.0336    1.0337    1.0000   
DMU 13  1.0301    1.0481    0.9832    0.9956    0.9877   
DMU 14  1.0067    1.0143    0.9925    1.0243    0.9696   
DMU 15  1.0097    1.0174    0.9931    1.0009    0.9925   
DMU 16  1.0310    1.0187    1.0124    1.0241    0.9897   
DMU 17  1.0099    1.0156    0.9943    1.0178    0.9773   
DMU 18  1.0054    1.0105    0.9949    0.9958    0.9977   
DMU 19  1.0591    1.0117    1.0475    1.0652    0.9837   
DMU 20  1.0717    1.0207    1.0511    1.0811    0.9720   
DMU 21  1.0359    1.0116    1.0245    0.9875    1.0369   
DMU 22  1.0280    1.0213    1.0083    1.0242    0.9836   
DMU 23  1.0364    1.0209    1.0156    1.0500    0.9668   
DMU 24  1.0117    1.0183    0.9941    0.9998    0.9942   
DMU 25  1.0159    1.0298    0.9872    1.0179    0.9705   












DMU 27  1.0785    1.0181    1.0585    1.0057    1.0543   
DMU 28  0.9901    1.0147    0.9739    0.9866    0.9865   
DMU 29  1.0008    1.0162    0.9841    0.9913    0.9920   
DMU 30  1.0113    1.0280    0.9849    0.9642    1.0212   
DMU 31  1.0205    1.0239    0.9967    0.9710    1.0259   
DMU 32  1.0191    1.0227    0.9963    0.9993    0.9970   
DMU 33  1.0014    1.0115    0.9896    1.0000    0.9896   
DMU 34  1.0702    1.0425    1.0256    1.0432    0.9827   
DMU 35  0.9994    1.0079    0.9917    1.0008    0.9911   
DMU 36  1.0220    1.0018    1.0206    1.0307    0.9905   
DMU 37  1.0680    1.0523    1.0150    1.0000    1.0150   
DMU 38  1.1007    1.0442    1.0528    0.9880    1.0671   
DMU 39  1.0074    1.0149    0.9927    1.0197    0.9731   
DMU 40  1.0201    1.0209    0.9983    1.0007    0.9976    
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DEA Technical Efficiency Scores 














DMU 1  0.855  0.978  0.889  0.882  0.878  0.906  0.927  0.962  0.875 
DMU 2  0.914  0.913  0.908  0.905  0.912  0.924  0.914  0.927  0.93 
DMU 3  0.961  0.954  0.881  0.913  0.944  0.97  0.966  0.945  0.963 
DMU 4  0.854  0.866  0.855  0.953  0.946  0.956  0.97  0.93  0.907 
DMU 5  0.973  0.949  0.939  0.955  0.938  0.95  0.932  0.931  0.938 
DMU 6  0.904  0.794  0.913  0.961  0.957  0.963  0.948  0.949  0.945 
DMU 7  0.923  0.921  0.917  0.926  0.939  0.964  0.953  0.962  0.965 
DMU 8  0.914  0.921  0.903  0.912  0.909  0.923  0.936  0.915  0.911 
DMU 9  0.908  0.911  0.93  0.918  0.915  0.919  0.919  0.91  0.927 
DMU 10  0.909  0.929  0.941  0.91  0.912  0.909  0.921  0.936  0.955 
DMU 11  0.97  0.976  0.966  0.966  0.972  0.964  0.964  0.962  0.973 
DMU 12  0.962  1  0.988  1  1  1  1  0.997  1 
DMU 13  1  1  0.981  0.994  0.993  0.99  0.974  0.952  0.966 
DMU 14  0.91  0.909  0.896  0.898  0.877  0.901  0.902  0.925  0.916 
DMU 15  0.909  0.91  0.887  0.89  0.904  0.901  0.909  0.899  0.924 
DMU 16  0.819  0.82  0.8  0.809  0.803  0.793  0.846  0.911  0.871 
DMU 17  0.916  0.905  0.909  0.9  0.904  0.906  0.917  0.918  0.924 
DMU 18  0.992  0.988  0.972  0.97  0.978  0.983  1  1  0.999 
DMU 19  0.877  0.895  0.903  0.91  0.912  0.933  0.92  0.924  0.998 
DMU 20  0.907  0.935  0.943  0.95  0.951  0.956  0.969  0.964  1 
DMU 21  0.918  0.937  0.935  0.939  0.943  0.94  0.943  0.97  0.941 
DMU 22  0.864  0.876  0.859  0.871  0.874  0.88  0.878  0.859  0.876 
DMU 23  0.909  0.923  0.918  0.917  0.926  0.922  0.926  0.917  0.948 
DMU 24  0.988  0.96  0.927  0.985  1  0.99  0.983  1  1 
DMU 25  0.915  0.915  0.933  0.898  0.897  0.9  0.907  0.888  0.884 












DMU 27  0.897  0.939  0.951  0.95  0.957  0.955  0.976  0.972  0.953 
DMU 28  0.848  0.845  0.828  0.83  0.786  0.742  0.866  0.843  0.851 
DMU 29  0.992  0.996  0.971  0.969  0.974  0.984  0.97  0.985  0.944 
DMU 30  0.965  0.973  0.935  0.96  0.974  0.962  0.941  0.912  0.927 
DMU 31  0.945  0.942  0.944  0.92  0.95  0.984  0.939  0.921  0.928 
DMU 32  1  1  1  0.992  0.993  0.996  1  1  0.986 
DMU 33  1  1  1  1  1  0.95  0.959  1  1 
DMU 34  0.935  0.959  0.931  0.957  0.964  1  0.974  0.95  0.961 
DMU 35  0.943  0.966  0.958  0.937  0.915  0.944  0.927  0.919  0.906 
DMU 36  0.934  0.947  0.929  0.939  0.97  0.99  0.973  0.954  0.95 
DMU 37  0.984  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.999  1 
DMU 38  0.889  0.883  1  1  0.919  0.949  0.959  0.956  0.884 
DMU 39  0.885  0.883  0.874  0.875  0.877  0.889  0.874  0.855  0.898 
DMU 40  0.977  0.98  0.982  0.985  0.986  0.969  0.961  0.975  0.97 
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